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Review Essays
Drones, Drone Strikes, and US Policy: The
Politics of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Ulrike Esther Franke
© 2014 Ulrike Esther Franke

T

he use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in military operations
is currently among the most hotly debated topics in the national
and international media. While at first few showed interest in
this military technology, the increasing number of missile strikes carried
out via UAVs in remote areas of Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia by the
United States Armed Forces and the CIA has raised public awareness.
Today, reports on “drone strikes” are published daily; UAV names such
as Global Hawk, Predator, or Reaper are on everyone’s lips. Criticism
of the use of unmanned technology has equally gained momentum.
Several organizations lobby for the complete or partial ban of drones,
efforts which have resulted in a discussion on adding a protocol to the
Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) to ban fully autonomous
UAVs. High-ranking members of the US defense community have
advised caution regarding the use of armed drones and propose moratoria on US drone strikes.1
Drones—unmanned, remotely piloted, aerial vehicles, short
UAVs—are now used by the armed forces of approximately 70 countries around the world. The club of armed UAV holders remains more
exclusive; for the moment, its members only include Israel, the United
Kingdom, the United States, and most likely China and Iran. This situation, however, is likely to change sooner rather than later with many
countries considering the procurement of armed drones.
The four books reviewed in this essay are all motivated by the belief
that “the precipitous increase in drone use we have witnessed over the
past few years represents just the beginning of the proliferation and
widespread use of UAVs, across many contexts.”2 Disagreement may
reign over whether or not this development is positive; however, the
authors agree on one point: drones are here to stay.
Many articles and papers have been written on UAV use, but
scholarly debate has been surprisingly slow with academia only getting
intensively involved in recent years. Accordingly, this review features
works by a journalist, an anti-drone activist, and several academics.

Winning the Battle but Losing the Hearts and Minds—The
Importance of Drone Perceptions

Perceptions matter, sometimes even more than reality. Drones certainly have a dreadful reputation—even though they may not necessarily
1     David Kilcullen and Andrew McDonald Exum, “Death From Above, Outrage Down Below,”
The New York Times, May 16, 2009.
2     Bradley Strawser, ed., Killing by Remote Control. The Ethics of an Unmanned Military (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013), 9.
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deserve it. This is what Brian Glyn Williams
tells readers in Predators: The CIA’s Drone War
on al Qaeda.
Williams, a professor of Islamic History
at the University of Massachusetts at
Dartmouth and an expert on the history of
the Middle East, cofounded in 2009 UMass
Drone, a research project and open-source
online database on attacks carried out via
armed drones.3 With Predators, Williams aims
at “record[ing] the history of what amounts
to an all-out CIA drone war on the Taliban
and al Qaeda.”4 A historian by training, he
claims wanting to stay neutral in the emotive
drone debate: “Proponents and opponents
Brian Glyn Williams, Predators: The CIA’s
of the campaign can do with this story what
Drone War on al Qaeda (Washington DC:
Potomac Books, 2013), 281 pages, $29.95. they will.”5 His neutrality may be debatable;
Williams clearly has his own opinion on
whether the use of drones in counterterrorism is effective. Nevertheless,
Predators is recommended reading to those interested in how US counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan and elsewhere have affected civilian
populations living in the targeted countries.
Williams studies the impact of the missile strikes by US drones
in remote regions of the world, in particular in Pakistan’s Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The book is clearly enhanced by
Williams’s deep knowledge of Pakistani politics and the Pashtun tribal
areas. He ensures his readers get at least a general notion of its history,
emphasizing that the FATA has always been an independent entity
rather than a proper part of the Pakistani state.
Williams’s main argument has three parts: (1) The US drone strikes
in Pakistan are precise and succeed in killing high-value targets and
lower-level Taliban operatives (some of whom have plotted against the
United States and other Western nations); (2) The perception of the
strikes is very negative in Pakistan and abroad; (3) The drone campaign
may ultimately prove counterproductive as it alienates the public whose
hearts and minds need to be won.
In Williams’s words, the United States:
[C]ontinue[s] to wrestle with a paradox. While the war against the Taliban
was transformed into a hunt for HVTs [high-value targets], it became
obvious that America’s most advanced weapon in the hunt for elusive terrorists might also be their worst enemy in the underlying battle to win the
hearts and minds of the people of this volatile region;6
Perceptions can be more important than reality;7 and

3     UMASS Drone Home Page, http://www.umassdrone.org/.
4     Brian Glyn Williams, Predators: The CIA’s Drone War on al Qaeda (Washington, DC: Potomac
Books, 2013), xi.
5     Ibid.
6     Ibid., 38.
7     Ibid., 207.
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Drone strikes are a public relations and strategic disaster in Pakistan.8

Williams argues the missile strikes by American UAVs are precise
and kill comparatively few civilians because of six distinct factors:
bureaucratic safeguards ensuring targets are selected properly; UAVs’
ability to loiter for a long time, which increases intelligence and allows a
strike at the most opportune moment; high resolution cameras; human
intelligence on the ground thanks to a spy network and support by the
Pakistani government and security services; the use of smaller missiles; and the tactic to target combatants while they are in vehicles.9 By
analyzing many strikes, he shows that although mistakes and accidents
have caused civilian casualties, the majority of those killed are highvalue targets and lower-level Taliban operatives. Williams’s analysis of
the strikes is thorough; his assessment and critique of some of those
organizations collecting data on these strikes is at times, however, disproportionate and would have benefited from more extensive editing.
The fact that the strikes are efficient has clearly not reached the
Pakistani public, or rather, Williams argues, it was not communicated
properly: “Without an American public relations campaign to counteract the critics’ attacks on the drone efforts, they remained a mystery
for most outsiders, who assumed the worst.”10 Misperceptions do not
only exist regarding information on the number of civilian casualties.
Many Pakistanis were and still are outraged by the apparent US drones’
incursions into their national territory. Williams argues:
[B]oth their elected leaders (Musharraf, Zardari, and Gilani) and their military leaders have actively supported the drone campaign—so much so that
they have allowed the CIA to run drone strikes on the Taliban and al Qaeda
from the Shamsi Air base in Pakistan. If the United States is, or was, allowed
to operate on Pakistani soil with Pakistani troops guarding the drone base
at Shamsi, their operations cannot be termed a violation of sovereignty.”11

But, Williams criticizes, neither the United States nor the Pakistani
government has made real efforts to fight misperceptions or even
deliberate misrepresentations, which is why these misperceptions have
spread. Ultimately, the reader is left wondering whether this is all worth
it: “Opinion in Pakistan, a country of 190 million people, is being turned
against the United States all for the sake of killing hundreds of low-level
Taliban fighters.”12

The Macro View

Mark Mazzetti’s The Way of the Knife is not about the use of UAVs per
se. Rather, Mazzetti, The New York Times national security correspondent
and Pulitzer Prize winner, discusses more generally the new ways of
US military action: the use of a “scalpel” rather than a “hammer”— a
phrase coined by former chief counterterrorism advisor John Brennan
and which inspired the book’s title.13 For Mazzetti, the “way of the
8     Ibid., 206.
9     Ibid., 101-110.
10     Ibid., 86.
11     Ibid., 189.
12     Ibid., 212.
13     The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism John Brennan at CSIS, May 26, 2010.
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knife” is, however, not a positive metaphor
but consists in “a shadow war waged across
the globe” in which “America has pursued
its enemies using killer robots and specialoperations troops.”14
The book is based on hundreds of interviews with current and former government
officials as well as members of the CIA and
the military. Mazzetti opens the black box
of some of the most secretive US organizations—the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC),
the State Department, and the Pentagon.
Mazzetti describes, placing much focus on
the story of individuals, how the context of
Mark Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife. The
the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the following
CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends
military interventions have transformed the
of the Earth (New York: Penguin Press,
2013), 381 pages, $29.95.
United States and its ability to wage wars.
In the book, the author explains how US intelligence and military
work became blurred and how it militarized the CIA. In the early 2000s,
“the Pentagon had the capabilities for hunting-and-killing operations,
but the CIA had the authorities.”15 After 9/11, and due to the workings
of a number of influential officials, the CIA revived and JSOC came
of age. The result was a jockeying between the Pentagon and CIA
for supremacy in new American conflicts. Eventually, “the Central
Intelligence Agency has become a killing machine, an organization
consumed with man hunting,”16 while JSOC became “the secret army
. . . needed to fight a global war.”17
Mazzetti retraces the development of the CIA since the 1990s. He
describes how the agency lost most of its power with the end of the Cold
War and some embarrassing revealings of past activities. This changed
with the Global War on Terror. The CIA is “no longer a traditional espionage service devoted to stealing the secrets of foreign governments,
[it] has become a killing machine, an organization consumed with man
hunting.”18 The descriptions of the inner-CIA discussions about the
role of the agency and their use of armed UAVs are particularly interesting. When the first missiles where strapped onto Predator aircraft in
2000, the CIA did not show much enthusiasm for them. The aircraft
“looked like a gangly insect and had a loud engine that made it sound
like a flying lawnmower.”19 Also, in this pre-9/11 world, “the idea of
the CIA establishing military-style bases anywhere in the world seemed
crazy.”20 Targeted assassinations were not an option: “We’re not like
that. We’re not Mossad,” Richard Clarke is cited saying. A former head
of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Centre later told the 9/11 Commission
14     Mark Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife. The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth
(New York: Penguin Press, 2013), 5.
15     Ibid., 81.
16     Ibid., 4.
17     Ibid., 75.
18     Ibid., 4.
19     Ibid., 91.
20     Ibid., 92.
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that in the years before the attacks, they would have refused a direct
order to kill bin Laden.21
The JSOC is portrayed as the brain child of Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld—the chapter on JSOC is entitled “Rumsfeld’s Spies.”
In it, Mazzetti describes how Rumsfeld “envied the spy agency’s ability
to send its operatives anywhere, at any time, without having to ask
permission.”22 His answer? “[T]o make the Pentagon more like the
CIA.”23 Eventually, JSOC became “the secret army [Rumsfeld] needed
to fight a global war.”24
Readers predominantly interested in UAVs will find chapter 5 particularly informative; in it, Mazzetti describes the initial stages of the
CIA’s drone program. Equally enlightening are Mazzetti’s reports of
several instances where drones were used because manned operations
were considered too risky politically. Putting boots on the ground would
be considered an invasion, while putting armed drones in the air to do
the same job was considered less of an infraction.25
Mazzetti’s book is an interesting and even entertaining work, loaded
with interview quotes and background information. He underlines the
importance of the context in which the new US way of warfare was born
as well as the role specific individuals played. Indeed, his focus on the
individuals involved can, at times, be distracting. The author rarely mentions a person without giving his or her background—education, family
situation, and career development. This, combined with the novel-like
writing style, can at times distract from more important elements.
Furthermore, there is no chronological and very little geographical or
thematic order in Mazzetti’s writing—trying to find a specific piece of
information can, therefore, be challenging. This critique notwithstanding, this book should lie on the nightstand of all those readers interested
in the CIA and the inner workings of a nation at war.

Stop the Drones—The Activist’s View

No review on drone literature would be complete without Medea
Benjamin’s Drone Warfare, which has become one of the most-read books
on UAV use. Benjamin is a political activist, best known for her interruption of President Obama’s counterterrorism speech at the National
Defense University in May 2013 where she demanded to “take the drones
out of the hands of the CIA” and to end signature strikes.
There is no ambiguity—Benjamin is an activist, and Drone Warfare
is an activist’s book. It is not a book about drone use, but against it.
Benjamin’s position is clear: “The drone wars represent one of the greatest travesties of justice in our age.”26 For her, UAVs are “death robots,”27
“killing machines,”28 and “killer drones.”29 The book is a pamphlet
21     Ibid., 88.
22     Ibid., 68.
23     Ibid., 68.
24     Ibid., 75.
25     Ibid., 116, 133.
26     Medea Benjamin, Drone Warfare. Killing by Remote Control (London: Verso, 2013), 124.
27     Ibid., 53.
28     Ibid., 28.
29     Ibid., 15.
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against armed drones, and parts of it could
double as a pacifist manifest. Benjamin
quotes President Eisenhower’s famous statement that “Every gun that is made, every
warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who
hunger and are not fed, those who are cold
and are not clothed.”30 Following this same
logic, she criticizes the procurement of US
drones during a financial crisis which “led to
the slashing of government programs from
nutrition supplements for pregnant women
to maintenance of national parks.”31 The
book is permeated by emotional stories of
maimed Pakistani and Afghan children and
parents who have to bury their sons “in the
Medea Benjamin, Drone Warfare. Killing
by Remote Control (London: Verso, 2013), dry cold soil of the village they had loved.”32
246 pages, $16.95.
The last two chapters are dedicated to activism against drone use and US military policy.
This is one side of Benjamin’s book. At the same time, Drone Warfare
is also an informative, well-researched work that provides the reader
with an extensive list of references. Benjamin tries to discuss the most
important aspects of the use of armed UAVs: the history and development of drones, the drone market, the points of view of drone pilots,
the legality and morality of their use, drone use by other countries, and
the points of view of drone use by terrorists and victims. As informative literature on UAV use is still scarce and mainly comes in forms
of newspaper reports, this in itself is laudable. Her discussion of the
drone market and the UAV-“military-industrial-complex” is particularly
enlightening. Even well-informed readers can be sure to find new pieces
of information and good quotes. Readers new to the subject get an overview of the main points of discussion.
Unfortunately, Benjamin’s generic opposition to the use of armed
drones stands in the way of an academically rigorous discussion of the
topic. Her critique is unfocused, as the object of her criticism is not clear.
She often does not differentiate between the technology, i.e., unmanned
weaponry, and policy, or using unmanned weaponry in specific ways
in specific contexts. This is a general problem of the drone debate; for
Benjamin it means that a lot of her criticism appears ill-directed.
At times, her critique of both the wars and drones appears a bit
naïve, as no alternative is proposed. It is not clear what Benjamin argues
in favor of. When she criticizes that “[w]hen military operations are
conducted through the filter of a far-away video camera, there is no
possibility of making eye contact with the enemy and fully realizing
the human cost of an attack,” the reader is left wondering what the
alternative would be.33 Returning to a type of warfare in which soldiers
make eye contact with their enemies (a type of warfare lying long in
30     Ibid., 54.
31     Ibid., 17.
32     Ibid., 111.
33     Ibid., 160.
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the past, not only since the advent of drones)? Benjamin fails to answer
these questions.
Benjamin’s book is a good introduction to the topic and interesting
read even for those familiar with the debate. One should, however, be
advised to counterbalance the biased view with other, preferably more
academic and analytically rigorous accounts.

Gut Instincts are not Enough—Academia’s Contribution

Killing by Remote Control: The Ethics of an Unmanned Military adds
academic and analytical rigour to the discussion. In the current drone
debate—largely dominated by journalists and activists and often conducted on an emotional level—this book serves as a reminder of the
merits of scholarly work. The volume was edited by Bradley Jay Strawser,
assistant professor of Philosophy at the United States Naval Postgraduate
School in Monterey, California. Strawser is best-known by students of
drone warfare through his groundbreaking article “Moral Predator, The
Duty to Employ Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles.”34
While Strawser, because of this paper, is sometimes considered a
drone advocate, his agenda in Killing by Remote Control is to “push the
scholarly conversation [over the ethics of drones] to a deeper analytic
level.”35 He believes the debate needs to move out of the “first wave”
of journalistic attention: “those of us working and thinking seriously
about these questions need to move out of those early phases […]. Killing
by Remote Control: The Ethics of an Unmanned Military is part of that deeper
analytic push.”36
The book’s chapters discuss the ethics of using remotely controlled
weapons for lethal missions. The focus lies on armed UAVs, targeted
killings, and autonomous systems. Many tricky ethical questions are
addressed in the book:
•• Can drone warfare be analyzed through
the lenses of Just War Theory or are new
theories and rules needed?
•• Does the use of UAVs undermine military
virtues?
•• Does the use of UAVs imply the judgment that the targets of such weapons are
expendable while the operators are not?
•• Do UAVs make war more likely and is this
necessarily a negative development?
•• Should extreme military asymmetry in
warfare be condemned?
•• Are there ethical differences between
Strawser, ed., Killing by Remote
remotely piloted and autonomous Bradley
Control: The Ethics of an Unmanned
Military (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013), 296 pages, $49.95.

34     Bradley Jay Strawser, “Moral Predators: The Duty to Employ Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles”
Journal of Military Ethics 9, no. 4 (2010): 342-68.
35     Strawser, Killing by Remote Control, 5.
36     Ibid.
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weapons?
In the particularly thought-provoking chapter 6, “Robot Guardians:
Teleoperated Combat Vehicles in Humanitarian Military Intervention,”
Zack Beauchamp and Julian Savulescu address the claim that armed
drones will make war easier and, therefore, more likely—an assertion
frequently brought forward by anti-drone activists. The authors argue
that “lowering the threshold is not, as commonly assumed, necessarily
a bad thing. In at least one case, the bug is in fact a feature: drones
have the potential to significantly improve the practice of humanitarian
intervention.”37 In their opinion, often, “the wars states do not fight
are the ones they most ought to,” namely, interventions to stop human
rights abuses and crimes against humanity.38 The reason for the reticence
is casualty aversion. If drones make going to war easier as they minimize the risk to the intervening soldiers, this means that intervening
for humanitarian reasons would equally be made easier. Furthermore,
according to Beauchamp and Savulescu, when states grant significant
weight to minimizing their own casualties, “they are more likely to
fight in ways that result in significant—and preventable—loss of civilian life.”39 UAVs could, therefore, help to reduce civilian casualties in
humanitarian interventions.
Avery Plaw’s chapter “Counting the Dead: The Proportionality of
Predation in Pakistan,” should become compulsory reading for anyone
interested in the discussion of the effectiveness of targeted killing via
drones. Plaw, a colleague of Brian Glyn Williams at UMass Drone,
analyzes the numbers on civilian casualties in Pakistan gathered by the
four “most rigorous and transparent databases” that track the impact of
drone strikes, namely The New America Foundation, The Long War Journal,
UMass Drone, and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism.40 By meticulously
studying their numbers, Plaw concludes the missile attacks have been
“highly effective in eliminating enemy operations, including key
leaders, particularly when these HVTs [high-value targets] are hidden
in inaccessible and politically problematic locations like the FATA.”41
Furthermore, Plaw shows that US nondrone operations in the FATA,
such as precision artillery strikes or commando raids, have caused much
higher civilian casualties than attacks via drones. Therefore, he argues
that the issue of proportionality does not provide a basis “for claiming
that US drone strikes in general are either unethical or illegal (although
this does not preclude such claims on other grounds).”42
Not all of the authors see the development towards an increased
use of UAVs positively though. David Whetham (chapter 4 “Drones and
targeted killing: Angels or Assassins?”) warns the US strikes in remote
areas of Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia are establishing a norm which
“doesn’t get used just by ‘nice people’.”43 He criticizes the United States
for not being more transparent with regard to its actions.
37     Ibid., 106.
38     Ibid., 114.
39     Ibid., 112.
40     Ibid., 126.
41     Ibid., 145.
42     Ibid., 127.
43     Ibid., 78.
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Without transparency as to why an individual has been killed, a targeted
killing carried out anywhere for the best of reasons and in the most careful,
conscientious, and professional way might as well be considered an assassination or just plain murder. If a state is not prepared to provide any of that
information at all or any reason or justification for a killing, then we should
refrain from calling such an action targeted killing and instead call it what it
effectively becomes—an execution.44

In “War without Virtue?” (chapter 5), Australian philosopher
Robert Sparrow expresses concerns that the use of UAVs for military
purposes poses a significant threat to martial virtues such as physical
and moral courage, loyalty, honor, and mercy. In his view, the introduction of UAVs marks “a significant quantitative—and perhaps even
qualitative—change in the nature of military combat.”45 Because of the
absence of risk to life and limb, and the fighting in complete safety,
martial virtues are no longer required. For Sparrow, this is a “disturbing
prospect.”46
It is impossible to do each paper of an edited volume justice in a
short review. Each of the eleven chapters in Killing by Remote Control
deserves more attention. The collection’s main contribution, however,
does not lie solely in the quality of its chapters and well-made arguments.
Rather, the volume in its entirety demonstrates the valuable contribution
scholarly writing can make to the current drone debate.
As editor Bradley Strawser emphasizes, it is crucial to question one’s
beliefs and intuitions. At first sight, there appears to be “something
profoundly disturbing about the idea of a war conducted by computer
console operators, who are watching over and killing people thousands
of kilometers away.”47 On closer examination, though, the views “that
something is intrinsically wrong with this form of killing over other
forms of killing, simply in virtue of being remotely controlled, across all
possible circumstances . . . are surprisingly hard to articulate consistently
and clearly.”48 Strawser’s call to look closer and be more rigorous is particularly convincing since he admits “in following the arguments where
they led, I ultimately arrived at several conclusions rather far afield from
my initial ‘gut instincts’ that first got me interested in the topic.”49 “Gut
instincts” can and should not lead an academic debate. Rather, “such
sentiments must be unpacked . . . ; an argument is needed, not mere
assertion. At this point in the debate, we still await such an argument.”50
Killing by Remote Control is an important step in this direction.

Conclusion

Each of the four books discussed in this review has specific merits—
Predator gives a fascinating account of the Pakistani perspective; The Way
of the Knife allows an insight into the black box of US state agencies in their
global fight against terrorism; Drone Warfare is an appealing example of
activism literature; and Killing by Remote Control is a useful scholarly work
44     Ibid., 82, 83.
45     Ibid., 86.
46     Ibid., 104.
47     Ibid., 88.
48     Ibid., 10
49     Ibid., xvii.
50     Ibid., 12.
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on the ethics of drone use. While these books naturally have flaws, as a
whole they form a comprehensive overview of the current drone debate.
The drone literature still suffers from shortcomings. As the four
books show, the debate revolves almost exclusively around the use of
armed UAVs for lethal operations. Unarmed UAVs, which have proliferated extensively over the last few years, are rarely, if ever, discussed.
While “killer robots” may be more attention-grabbing than surveillance
UAVs, the almost complete disregard of other UAV types is deplorable.
The focus also predominantly lies on the US use of drones even though
more and more countries procure and use UAVs. More research is needed
with regard to these developments. In general, more data, official data in
particular, is needed, such as the numbers of civilian deaths caused by
missiles fired from UAVs.
One interesting fact that deserves more attention is touched on
by several of the authors but not discussed in detail. It appears that
operations—even lethal ones—carried out by UAVs are perceived as
being less intrusive, less of an infraction of a state’s sovereignty. Brian
Williams shows how the Pakistani public appears to accept UAVs more
than boots on the ground: “The Pakistanis were willing to countenance
the occasional civilian death or attacks on militants if they were administered by unmanned drones, US troops landing on Pakistani territory
was essentially construed as an act of war.”51 Mark Mazzetti makes
a similar point. While most international lawyers would not support
such a view, President Obama recently voiced the same idea when he
discussed the drone program in May 2013. He warned about the risk
that manned operations would “lead [the US] to be viewed as occupying armies, unleash a torrent of unintended consequences,” and “may
trigger a major international crisis.”52 Sending drones, the message was,
is much less controversial.
It is clear that much research remains to be done with regard
to the study of UAV use for military purposes. The works reviewed
here provide a useful basis for further research and are a good step
in this direction.

51     Williams, Predators, 74.
52     The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President at the National
Defense University, May 23, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/
remarks-president-national-defense-university.
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T. E. Lawrence: Enigmatic Military Visionary
W. Andrew Terrill

T

.E. Lawrence is the most well-known British national hero of
World War I. In the Arabian Desert, Lawrence waged a war of
movement against Turkish forces that contrasted starkly with the
gruesome deadlock on the Western front. In pursuing his own version
of desert combat, Lawrence was an early and important advocate of
modern guerrilla warfare tactics, and his exploits during the 1916-18
desert war showed significant military gains for his highly inventive and
unorthodox form of combat. Geopolitically, Lawrence’s actions had a
direct bearing on the formation of the modern Middle East, and his
controversial legacy is still important today. Under these circumstances,
it is hardly surprising that a number of Lawrence biographies have been
published during and after his lifetime. More recently, there has been a
notable increase in such works in the years following the US invasion
of Iraq in March 2003. As the United States encountered ongoing difficulties in that country, Lawrence’s actions throughout the Arab world
may have seemed relevant to the important strategic and operational
questions that needed answers. These questions revolved around not just
guerrilla warfare but also finding ways in which Arab and Western troops
could build mutual trust and function effectively as partners.

Lawrence as a Military Thinker: Amateur Among Professionals

Former war correspondent Scott Anderson has some interesting
insights about Lawrence’s understanding of military culture and the
conduct of military operations, including his willingness to challenge
conventional wisdom. Anderson notes that Lawrence was well-read on
military topics, but he had no formal officer’s training prior to receiving a
1914 direct commission as an acting second lieutenant. As a junior officer,
Lawrence was assigned to intelligence duties
in Cairo due to his understanding of Middle
Eastern cultures and the Arabic language.
He developed these skills over his four years
as a junior field archeologist, primarily based
in Syria. In his early army career, Lawrence
was a brilliant intelligence officer, but he
also had a rebellious personality and maintained a dismissive attitude toward higher
authority. His sometimes uncomfortable
encounters with military bureaucracy and
various doctrinaire senior officers also gave
him serious doubts about the future of the
war. Early in his military career, Lawrence
provided strategic briefings to a number of
senior officers assigned to the Mediterranean
Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia: War,
Expedition (MED-EX) and was appalled Scott
Deceit, Imperial Folly and the Making
when he found out about their plan for of the Modern Middle East (New York:
an invasion at Gallipoli, Turkey, which he Doubleday, 2013), 57 pages, $28.95.
W. Andrew Terrill, Ph.D. is a research professor at the US Army War College at Carlisle Barracks,
PA.
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viewed as a “despicable mess.” While Lawrence expected the landing at
Gallipoli to be a disaster, even he was probably surprised by the scale of
the catastrophe. The young officer was further disillusioned as evidence
began to pour in that the alternative invasion site advocated by the Cairo
intelligence office appeared to have been a golden opportunity for an
easy victory. This alternative plan called for an invasion of Alexandretta
(now called Iskenderun) which was defended by a garrison of mostly
Arab conscripts on the verge of mutiny against their Turkish officers.
Lawrence had an even closer view of the next Middle Eastern
disaster following Gallipoli. This was the effort to seize Baghdad from
the east with an Anglo-Indian army. This force advanced deep into the
Iraqi hinterland without properly protected supply lines and the Turks
correspondingly surrounded and isolated it in the city of Kut. As with
Gallipoli, proper military procedures were disregarded due to a prevailing belief that the enemy was “tough but slow-witted” and, therefore, did
not need to be treated in the same way as a European adversary. Also
like Gallipoli, there was a high price for this arrogance. Lawrence was
called in from Cairo in late 1915 to help British Major General Charles
Townshead negotiate with the Turks for the release of his surrounded
troops. Through Lawrence and other intermediaries, the best the British
commander could do was to seek to bribe the Turkish general with gold.
This treasonous offer was quickly and contemptuously rejected and the
entire British force of 13,000 was compelled to surrender. As a mediator
brought in for the specific task of negotiating with the Turks, Lawrence
was not made a prisoner of war, but he had a firsthand view of the fruits of
poor planning and lofty British distain for the enemy. Closer to the Cairo
headquarters, British offensives to break through the Turkish line at Gaza
failed twice. Lawrence was also deeply unhappy with what he called the
“staggering incompetence” on the Western front in Europe where two
of his brothers, Frank and Will, were killed in 1915 and 1916 respectively.
In generating his own strategic vision, Lawrence believed the British
should embrace the “Arab way of war” as the organizing principle for
the “Arab Revolt” against Turkey. This uprising had originated with
Sherif (later King) Hussein of the Hejaz (in what is now western Saudi
Arabia). In Lawrence’s view, warfare in Arabia bore a striking resemblance to the medieval warfare he had studied at Oxford with its use of
multiple decentralized forces under various autonomous nobles. Arab
raiders had no military discipline, no NCOs, and numerous debates
among themselves over just about everything they did. In evaluating
their potential against the Turks, Lawrence believed that Bedouin forces
fought effectively in small groups of raiders while they were usually
extremely poor raw material for training as conventional troops. In
particular, he saw the potential for Arab forces to play an effective role
in the war through hit-and-run strikes, long-range sharpshooting, and
a tradition of surprise attacks. Lawrence felt that the Arab forces could
make their greatest contribution by avoiding large battles and striking
unexpectedly at weak points in the Turkish defense, particularly logistical units and facilities and most especially the Hejaz railway. Lawrence
also hoped (as most competent military leaders do) to find ways to inflict
the absolute maximum damage with the minimum loss of life.
Lawrence gained the trust of the Arab Revolt’s leaders in ways that
went beyond simply being polite and knowing the Arabic language.
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Lawrence also passionately identified with Arab aspirations for independence. While this fervor is well known, Anderson goes further than
many authors and suggests that Lawrence became more loyal to Arab
independence than to anything else in the war. He notes that Lawrence
told the leading Arab field commander, Prince Feisal, about the SykesPicot Agreement for British and French domination of post-war Arab
lands, while it was still a state secret and by doing so technically committed treason. This act was the beginning of what Anderson calls “a
quiet war against his own government” where he “arguably betrayed his
country” (486). Anderson also notes that Lawrence attempted to convince an American intelligence officer, Captain William Yale, to speak to
his superiors in favor of Arab independence and push against British and
especially French policies for dominating the post-war region. Viewed
in this light, it is difficult to see how Feisal or the other Arab leaders
could have found much fault with Lawrence. He had their political best
interests at heart and he served as their strongest advocate in British
circles especially when vying for British military resources including
weapons and gold.
Anderson’s charge of possible treason seems vastly overblown since
the future of the Arab world was yet to be decided at the Paris Peace
Conference where British policies on such issues were to be finalized
in coordination with the other allies. The Sykes-Picot Agreement was
mostly a place holder that did not represent final or fully formed policy.
Additionally, General Allenby later made it clear that Feisal should have
been told about the Sykes-Picot Agreement at some point and expressed
surprise in 1918 when Lawrence (dishonestly) told him he had not done
so. Moreover, the British leadership knew of Lawrence’s commitment
to Arab freedom, and always saw it as an asset (but not a guide for
policy). Lawrence himself gave his own take on the loyalty issue in a
more indirect manner. The former guerrilla leader, who was famous
for his monumental self-recrimination (bordering on masochism), never
indicated that he felt the slightest bit disloyal to the United Kingdom
as a result of his wartime conduct. Rather, for the rest of his life, he
brutally blamed himself for lying to the Arabs on his country’s behalf
over the issue of Arab independence. While Lawrence was torn by conflicting British and Arab interests and priorities, he inevitably defaulted
to British interests while trying desperately to help the Arabs within the
constraint of these priorities. If Lawrence betrayed his country, he never
knew it and never felt it.
In a departure from other Lawrence biographies, Anderson’s book
also devotes considerable attention to the activities of British intelligence
units in the Middle East and the various spy networks in the Middle
East. The book also follows the activities of American oilman, soldier,
and government official William Yale, Zionist leader Aaron Aronson,
and German “orientalist” and spy Curt Prufer. These individuals were
important to the history of the Middle East but mostly peripheral to
the story of T. E. Lawrence. One cannot help suspecting that Anderson
included their activities in such depth in order to distinguish it from the
numerous other Lawrence biographies. Readers will probably view this
approach as either a useful innovation or a mistake, depending on their
interest in these people.
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Lawrence’s Personality: Strengths and
Weakness

A different kind of book is Hero by bestselling author Michael Korda. This work
serves as a comprehensive biography of T.
E. Lawrence from his childhood until his
death in a 1935 motorcycle accident. The
title clearly indicates Korda’s reverence for
Lawrence, whom he refers to as both a hero
and a genius. In contrast to the evaluation
put forward by Anderson, Korda states, “It
is worth noting that even though Lawrence
wanted the Arabs to win, and hoped by
getting to Damascus first to invalidate the
Michael Korda, Hero: The Life and Legend Sykes-Picot Agreement, he never forgot that
of Lawrence of Arabia (New York: Harper
he was a British officer first and foremost”
Perennial, 2011), 762 pages, $17.99.
(400). In a slightly more equivocal statement
he also claims, “No man ever tried harder to
serve two masters than Lawrence” (400). This argument may be more
defensible than Anderson’s technical treason argument for reasons
already discussed. Additionally, Lawrence was certainly hostile to the
Middle Eastern aspirations of the United Kingdom’s French ally, but
he would hardly be the first Briton to view the interests of the United
Kingdom and France as divergent. He further assumed some sort of
post-war association between the Arabs and the United Kingdom and
saw this as good for both parties.
A recurring point in this study is that Lawrence, by purpose or happenstance, had something approaching the perfect background for his
role as a driving force for the revolt in Arabia. Lawrence’s credentials
included his years in the Arab world, understanding of Arab social
structure, language, and culture, and wide-ranging reading on military
topics. Lawrence’s undergraduate passion for medieval fortifications
gave him a “feel for topography,” which he developed even further as
an intelligence officer and mapmaker for British intelligence in Cairo.
While still an undergraduate working on his thesis, Lawrence walked
over 1,000 miles throughout the Middle East visiting 36 castles dating
back to the crusades. Lawrence was even a crack pistol shot, although he
later fell short on this count when he accidentally killed his own camel
while participating in a charge against Turkish forces around 40 miles
from Aqaba. Lawrence also had a high tolerance for hardships and a
dismissive attitude toward creature comforts that served him well as
a guerrilla leader. He had no trouble existing on small amounts of bad
food and was able to go without sleep for days at a time. He tolerated
repeated bouts of malaria, dysentery, infected boils, and other ailments.
According to Korda, Lawrence, “lived at some point beyond mere stoicism and behaved as if he were indestructible” (198). This endurance
gave him the ability to inspire others and earned him the respect of very
tough Bedouin leaders such as Auda Abu Tayi of the Howitat tribe.
Korda’s detailed consideration of Lawrence’s personality and pre-war
background may be especially useful for military audiences interested in
questions of leadership. Lawrence had a great deal to offer the military
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but was sometimes a difficult officer to manage. He often assumed (correctly) that he knew more than his superiors and had very little regard
for military rank. Yet some leaders, including Brigadier General Clayton
of the intelligence service and especially General Edmund Allenby commanded Lawrence’s deep respect and loyal service. General Allenby,
and Lawrence maintained an especially strong relationship based on
mutual trust. Lawrence made significant promises to Allenby and then
endured tremendous hardship to keep them to the extent he could do so.
Lawrence was always attentive to the danger of disappointing Allenby
and on occasion took very serious personal risks to avoid letting his
commander down. Allenby in turn “rode Lawrence on the loosest of
reins” (196). He provided him with goals and objectives and then allowed
the young commander to reach them in his own way. In first meeting
with Lawrence, Allenby was clearly on the same page as the emerging
guerrilla leader. As a former horse cavalry officer, he quickly saw the
potential of Lawrence’s mobile force for conducting hard-hitting raids.
Allenby’s support for the Arab Revolt remained unequivocal, although
London showed uneven interest, and the British government in India
was concerned about its potential to inspire rebellious Muslims in India.
As noted, Korda’s book is the only study under review that provides
a comprehensive examination of Lawrence’s post-war activities. In the
years following the war, Lawrence moved forward some important
tasks before seeking obscurity. He played a key role at the Paris Peace
Conference as an advisor to Feisal and advocate of Arab goals. He
further served for a year as a senior official of the colonial office working
with Winston Churchill and others to help establish the new states of
Iraq and Transjordan (later Jordan). The part of his life that is more
difficult to understand is his decision to serve in the Royal Air Force,
and more briefly in the Royal Tank Corps, as a junior enlisted man for
a number of years. Surely his efforts to help the Arab people achieve
greater autonomy and eventual independence could have continued
after the war with him serving in progressively more responsible positions. In some ways, Lawrence seemed more interested in atoning for his
perceived sins than seeking to mitigate them. Korda has more difficulties with this part of the book, sometimes maintaining that Lawrence’s
decision to seek obscurity was rational, understandable, and based on
wartime trauma. He also somewhat defends the way in which Lawrence
rode his motorcycle (“motorcycles always appear suicidal to those who
don’t ride one” (590), while also noting that many of Lawrence’s friends
were mortified at what they saw as his daredevil ways. Lawrence had
already had two potentially fatal accidents with his motorcycle before a
third accident claimed his life in 1935.

Lawrence and Guerrilla Warfare

James Schneider’s book is an examination of Lawrence’s role in revolutionizing irregular warfare. It deals almost exclusively with the desert
war and gives no attention to Lawrence’s activities before or after the war.
This is not a book based on newly uncovered information or sources on
Lawrence’s life. Rather, it is a commentary and elaboration on the reasoning behind Lawrence’s military theories and actions by a professor
emeritus of military theory at the School of Advanced Military Studies of
the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth.
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This analysis is often conducted effectively
with Schneider teasing out the implications
of Lawrence’s views and analyzing why they
were effective in directing desert warfare
against conventional adversaries. He also
indicates the ways in which the Arab guerrilla forces were able to support General
Allenby’s conventional army as part of
the overall campaign. Schneider considers
Lawrence’s ideas about guerrilla warfare to
be a revolutionary reframing of the Arab
revolt. This reframing involved turning the
uprising into a war designed to exhaust the
Turkish enemy rather than seize territory or
capture cities such as Turkish–held Medina.
James Schneider, Guerrilla Leader: T. E.
Throughout this study, Schneider disLawrence and the Arab Revolt (New York:
plays a recurring interest in the concept of
Bantam, 2011), 328 pages, $28.00.
military leadership. He provides a particularly good critique of General Allenby, who despite early difficulties in
Europe became one of the war’s best generals. Schneider also considers
the role of Prince Feisal as a leader, although his most detailed consideration is naturally directed at Lawrence. Lawrence served as a key
decisionmaker on the distribution of British gold, weapons, and other
forms of support. Such responsibility creates leverage and opportunities
but only makes one a transactional military leader if it remains the sole
source of authority. Lawrence, however, quickly emerged as an inspiring
leader through his intelligence, bravery in battle, soaring oratory, and
total identification with their struggle against the Turks. Additionally
Schneider states that Lawrence increasingly relied on outstanding tribal
leaders for tactical leadership, thereby freeing him to provide purpose,
direction, and motivation to the Arab Revolt.
Schneider maintains that Lawrence was an effective leader because
he empathized with not only the wider goals of the Arab revolt, but also
with the needs of his own troops. Lawrence was sometimes reckless with
his own life, but never wasteful of the lives of the fighters who served
with him. The casualties inflicted on his forces troubled him deeply,
especially high among his personal bodyguard, who fought beside him
and were also needed due to the price on his head of twenty thousand
pounds alive or ten thousand dead. Scheider maintains that Lawrence’s
sensitivities dovetailed closely with the Arab view of warfare. He notes
that in Western militaries, the mission assigned by higher headquarters
almost always takes precedence over efforts to keep casualties low. In
contrast, among Arab raiders the welfare of the unit is almost always
more important since the fighters were often irreplaceable. If a mission
becomes too potentially costly in human lives, it is simply abandoned.
While Lawrence never willingly abandoned important missions set by
higher authority, he was careful to avoid striking well defended areas
and may have missed some lucrative targets of opportunity to protect
his own forces.
Schneider also states that Lawrence failed as a leader near the Arab
village of Tafas when, according to his book Seven Pillars of Wisdom,
Lawrence issued a “no prisoners” order to Arab forces moving against
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a retreating Turkish force after it had committed atrocities against Arab
villagers. Schneider maintains that at this point, Lawrence had lost his
“moral compass” and, therefore, his capacity for leadership. There are,
nevertheless, some uncertainties about this incident that Schneider
does not seem to consider. As is well known, Lawrence was a man of
extremely strong views about the Arab Revolt to the point that some
scholars view his writings as “sanitized” to portray the Arab army in the
best possible light.1 At no time was his version of events more suspect
than in the Tafas incident where he had been accused of being “transparently tendentious and misleading” for such factors as overemphasizing
the innocence of the Arab villagers, who were most likely well-armed
and in open rebellion against the Turks.2 James Barr (see below) has
additional reasons for doubting Lawrence’s account of Tafas based on
other eyewitness descriptions of the events there. Lawrence’s empathy,
which Schneider repeatedly notes as an asset, makes his acceptance of
the blame for this incident at least somewhat suspect. Events in Tafas
may have occurred despite Lawrence’s orders, and avenging Arab tribal
forces may have been uncontrollable by any one person at this point
regardless of leadership skills.

The Meaning of the Arab Revolt

Former journalist James Barr’s Setting the Desert on Fire is a focused
and thoughtful consideration of both the Arab Revolt and Lawrence’s
role in the uprising. More than any of the other books under review,
Barr considers the context and geopolitical consequences of Lawrence’s
actions by noting overlapping and clashing interests among a variety
of individuals, groups, and countries associated with the Middle East
theater. Like Anderson, Barr spends considerable effort sorting out
the motives and disagreements of a variety of nations and individuals.
Imperial powers like the United Kingdom and France had a number
of global interests and priorities, and many
of them were in contradiction. Adding to
the richness of the work, Barr is particularly nuanced in his understanding of Arab
tribal, regional, and other differences. He
also notes Lawrence’s own subtlety of mind
when considering intersecting political and
cultural/religious problems that came up
during the war. An important example of
Lawrence’s good judgment was his opposition to sending a British brigade into the
heart of the Hejaz. Non-Muslims are not
welcome in the Hejazi cities of Mecca and
Medina, but Lawrence believed that British
troops in this region were more of a political than a religious problem for the Arabs.
While religion might offer a strong religious James Barr, Setting the Desert on Fire:
Lawrence and Britain’s Secret War
justification for excluding Western troops, T.E.
in Arabia, 1916-1918 (New York: W.W.
Lawrence also knew that even Muslim Norton and Company, 2009), 362 pages,
troops from the British Empire would be $27.95.
1     John D. Grainger, The Battle for Syria, 1918-1920 (Suffolk: Boydell Press, 2013), 176.
2     Ibid. p. 166.
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equally unwelcome in such large numbers. His judgment was allowed to
prevail in this instance because of the agreement of a number of senior
officers.
Barr notes that one of the first guerrilla raids against the Hejaz railway
was conducted by Arab forces accompanied by Major Herbert Garland,
a British explosives expert, who eventually taught Lawrence about
techniques for using mines and bombs. Garland’s raid was a success,
destroying an irreplaceable Ottoman locomotive and seriously disrupting rail traffic between Anatolia and the Hejaz. Yet Garland returned
to the base at Wajh hating everything about working with Arab forces.
In particular, he viewed Arab raiding forces as insufficiently committed
to the missions they were given, unwilling to move quickly, constantly
diverted by efforts to find forage for the camels, and democratic to a
fault so that nothing gets done until considerable squabbling is worked
out. A variety of other British officers were equally appalled by the Arab
propensity for looting and belief that they were entitled to go home
after they had acquired a sufficient level of booty. British complaints are
easily understood, but the culture clash also presented a serious problem
for British-Arab unity of effort. Lawrence, in contrast to many of his
contemporaries, attempted to immerse himself in Arab culture, accepting delays and other problems as the cost of doing business. Lawrence
stated that he wanted to “rub off his British ways.” He endeavored to act
according to tribal values even when, as a foreigner, he would have been
easily forgiven for not doing so, at least in small matters. He also dressed
in Arab clothing, unlike other British officers.
Barr further displays a strong understanding of the nature of the
Arab military campaigns and probably does the best job of explaining the evolution of Arab tactics in this conflict. Lawrence started by
attacking trains with explosives, destroying train tracks, and demolishing telegraph wires and poles. He also attacked Turkish patrols, and
Arab raids became larger and struck at more important targets over the
course of the war. On one important occasion, he changed his approach
to defend the town of Tafileh which was threatened by conventional
Turkish attack. Lawrence’s victory at Tafilah gave the Arab army some
increased credibility, but it never really outgrew its raiding heritage or
developed into an effective force for seizing and retaining territory. It
was not easy to guide an Arab army during this period, even when many
differences could be overcome with liberal amounts of gold. Among
the “regular troops” who had defected from the Ottoman army, Syrian
and Iraqi factions were often angry with each other and required constant mediation. Likewise, the inexhaustible capacity of Bedouin troops
for looting often made this a higher priority for them than externally
imposed military objectives. Some would even seize booty while they
were under fire. Accountability for British-provided gold and supplies
was often maddeningly nonexistent.
Barr agrees with Anderson who states that Lawrence was a
“booster” and an “apologist” for the Arabs with whom he served. The
most striking example of this behavior occurred during the previously
noted incident near the village of Tafas shortly after a Turkish brigade
committed a number of atrocities, including the murder of children.
Furious Arab leaders, and especially the Howeitat chieftain, Auda abu
Tayi, demanded revenge and wiped out the entire force, killing the
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wounded where they had fallen and refusing to allow enemy troops to
surrender. According to Barr, and in contrast to Schenider’s analysis,
Lawrence seems to have had nothing to do with the decision to kill the
wounded Turks, although he did take responsibility for it. Barr quotes
Lawrence as stating, “We ordered ‘no prisoners’ and the men obeyed”
(287). Other witnesses do not remember it that way. Ali Jawdat, a future
Iraqi prime minister, described how Lawrence attempted to save a group
of prisoners but was unable to do so in the face of Arab forces bent on
revenge. Another British officer, Frederick Peake, who worked closely
with Lawrence stated that he was certain Lawrence did all he could to
stop the massacre but the tribal force was “beyond control.” As overall
victory approached, Lawrence may simply not have been prepared to see
the Arab army criticized or portrayed as an avenging mob so he changed
the story to assume the blame himself.
In the final campaigns of the Middle East theater, Allenby continued
to view Lawrence as indispensible. The squandering of vast amounts of
gold by Prince Feisal’s younger brother Zaid convinced him that while
the Arabs had been doing “pretty well,” they were also an “unstable lot”
who needed British leaders “they know and trust” (224). In Allenby’s
scheme of action, Lawrence not only had to cut important railroad links
and destroy key bridges, but he had to do so at precise times so the
Turks would lose capability to move troops exactly when these troops
were needed. Often he accomplished these goals, although setbacks
occurred. The Arab army was also important in supporting Allenby’s
deception plan, which sought to convince the Turks that the main allied
force arrayed against them would not strike on the coast. In late 1918,
Arab forces severely disrupted railroad activity at the important railroad
hub of Deraa and moved on to play an important role in the liberation
of Damascus.

Conclusion

Obviously, one will find a tremendous degree of overlap in four
recent books on T. E. Lawrence, although the same story can appear
quite differently from alternative vantage points. Scott’s book may
annoy some readers by its continuous biographical forays into the lives
of people Lawrence barely knew, but it is exceptionally strong in other
respects including the discussion of Lawrence’s personal growth as a
strategist and leader. Korda’s book is outstanding as a childhood-tograve biography, although the author’s great regard for Lawrence may
have caused him to appear a little too apologetic for some of Lawrence’s
more eccentric decisions. The Schneider book is interesting as an intellectual exercise, but Barr’s study is probably most valuable for a military
audience due to its detailed description of the military campaigning
associated with the Arab revolt and the political context in which this
struggle was conducted. The strong link between military actions and
political outcomes is clear in all these books but is especially nuanced
in Barr’s study.
Surprisingly, US military personnel seeking answers about contemporary problems through the prism of Lawrence’s life may find such
answers elusive when examining what Korda presents as his almost
perfect background and preparation for his task of supporting the
Arab Revolt. Beyond Lawrence’s linguistic skills and his understanding
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of Arab history and sociology was his total identification with Arab
goals. Lawrence believed in Arab independence and was continuously
searching for ways to achieve this goal through Arab battlefield accomplishments. Without this total commitment, Lawrence would never have
been fully trusted by leaders such as Prince Faisal no matter how well he
could congregate Arabic verbs. As fearless and knowledgeable as he was,
T. E. Lawrence could never have become Lawrence of Arabia if he felt
his mission was to convince the Arabs that they had no interests apart
from those of the United Kingdom. He knew better, they knew better,
and this understanding was the basis of brilliant wartime collaboration.

